America must rethink its public diplomacy strategy, says Jack
Leslie, chairman of Weber Shandwick Worldwide. This is an edited
transcript of his speech before the House Committee on International
Relations on November 14.
I've spent the better part of my career advising organizations and
individuals in developing countries on how best to use communications to
achieve their public policy objectives. And so, like many others, I've
seen that the events of the past two months have brought into sharp and
tragic relief the long-term failure of the United States to communicate
effectively with the 1.2 billion people of the Muslim world.
And I use the word "people" deliberately. For, historically as a nation,
we've communicated government to government, not people to people. And
it has been exacerbated since the Cold War, when we cut back on public
diplomacy in the false belief that it was less important to communicate
our values. We're good at talking to the heads of nations, but have
overlooked their hearts. It would be as if members of this committee
campaigned only to civic leaders in your districts and ignored
rank-and-file voters. There is no better evidence of this phenomenon
than the astounding fact that we aren't reminding those who march
against America that our nation went to war against Christian
fundamentalists to protect Muslim minorities in places like Bosnia and
Kosovo.
That said, most of us are well aware that the deep-seated hatred in the
Muslim world is no more the result of a communications failure by the
United States than the destruction of the World Trade Center was the
result of an intelligence failure. It is the result of many conditions -
widespread poverty, political repression, the ongoing
Palestinian-Israeli dispute, and America's involvement in these
situations, whether real or perceived - that are far more responsible
for public opinion in the Muslim world than is American public
diplomacy. The fact of the matter is that in most of these countries,
the only acceptable form of political expression has been to be
anti-American or anti-Israel.
A six-point plan
So while the antagonism we face in the Muslim world is not entirely our
fault, September 11 proved that it is our problem. And it is a problem
of both immediate and long-term proportions.
So what do we do about it? I believe that there are six courses of
action that are central to communicating the message of America.
First, we should heed the Powell Doctrine from the Persian Gulf War and
apply it now to communications. We must have clear objectives and then
we must bring overwhelming force - the full range of resources necessary
- to achieve those objectives.
It is unrealistic - and probably counterproductive - to suggest that in
the short-term we can sell America's values to the Arab street. We can,
however, make a strong case that Osama bin Laden and terrorist
organizations in the Muslim world haven't just hijacked airplanes, they
are trying to hijack Islam itself. So, to put it in political terms, the
short-term campaign should primarily be a negative one designed to put
the terrorists in a box. We need not be shy about it. In a culture that
above all else values family, bin Laden is estranged from his family,
ostracized from his tribe, a terrorist who murders innocent women and
children. We should be circulating widely the pictures of those Muslim
children in the United States who lost a parent during the attacks on
September 11. We need to personalize our communications.
In the long-term, our objective should be to encourage a dialogue among
Muslims about what are acceptable beliefs and behavior for Islam. We are
never going to convince radical Islamic fundamentalists of the benefits
of a pluralistic society. But we can carefully target those whose
opinions are soft, those who are undecided or conflicted. It should be
possible to persuade people who are searching for answers that the path
these radical elements have chosen is not only incompatible with the
teachings of the Koran, but antithetical to the kind of future most
people want to live.
Make changes, and get creative
Second, we need to reorganize how we manage public diplomacy. Our
government apparatus is still caught up in the Cold War, when we relied
upon an infrastructure with assets like Radio Free Europe, the Voice of
America, and our embassies to deliver our message. During those times,
we communicated our values to people willing to acknowledge and able to
receive them - people who wanted freedom and democracy.
These are very different times. A beefed-up Voice of America isn't going
to win this war. If we want to bring overwhelming force to the
communications battle, we'll need a centralized chain of command, not a
loose-knit collection of agencies and departments spread across the
government. The Coalition Information Center set-up by the White House
is a major step in the right direction.
Third, we need to tap into the best minds in this field. In our
business, we don't make widgets. We depend on the insights and talents
of individuals.
This is a creative process, and every effort must be made to recruit the
best creative minds to work with the US government. Reaching out to
groups like the Ad Council here and creative experts in the Muslim world
is critical.
Fourth, no tactic should be ruled out. CNN ran a segment recently on a
pro-bin Laden video game becoming popular in many Islamic countries.
Whether we counter with our own video games, use commercial advertising,
the internet, posters, or pamphlets - you name it, every tactical
approach should be considered that can deliver the right message to the
right targets with credibility. During the democratic revolution in the
Philippines, when Corazon Aquino had no access to the media except for
Catholic radio, we prompted Ted Koppel on Nightline to run a story about
the fact that Marcos bragged about military medals that turned out to be
fake. Marcos was so infuriated, he felt compelled to deny the charge in
the Philippine press, making it a campaign issue, and thus a turning
point in the campaign. We need to be similarly creative now in using
every available tactic at our disposal.
Fifth, just like our military campaign, we cannot win the communications
campaign without troops on the ground. This is not a war that will be
won on the airwaves alone. We must carry it to the street. Traditional
institutions, and certainly our government, lack the credibility needed
to carry the message. And so, we must rely on much more sophisticated
recruitment and training of credible people on the ground - clerics and
youth groups, sports heroes and teachers - anyone we can find to carry
the right messages.
And finally, we'll never succeed without actionable research. I'm sure
we have warehouses full of research throughout the government. But we
need to know much more than just what people are hearing and how they
are behaving. We need to know what messages and actions can change
attitudes and behavior - and what groups are most receptive to our
messages.
If we do these things, if we commit to using overwhelming force with
clear objectives and targeting, if we have centralized planning and a
chain of command, if we reach out to the best creative minds here and
abroad, if we demonstrate a willingness to employ innovative tactics and
sound, actionable research, then I believe America's message will be
heard.
It is a challenge no less important than any other in the new war
against terrorism.
